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ii

ARGUMENT
I.

ALLOWING THE STATE TO REFILE AFTER A DISMISSAL
FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE VIOLATES THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHERE NO NEW
EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED.

In State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the approach taken by the Oklahoma courts with respect to refiling of charges
dismissed for lack of probable cause. The Oklahoma courts have held that in order to
refile, a prosecutor should have new evidence or other good cause. See e.g.. Jones v.
State. 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim App. 1971).
In this case, the State attempts to justify the magistrate's decision to allow
refiling by focusing on language found in Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma
County. 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), which was subsequently cited as
dicta in a footnote in Brickey. As discussed in the Appellee's Brief, Harper provides
that "innocent miscalculations" may justify a continuance of the preliminary hearing,
but the case explicitly points out that to refile. there must be "newly discovered
evidence." Harper. 484 P.2d at 897.* This footnote was cited by this Court in State v.
Rivera. 871 P.2d 1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that the "State could
potentially refile the information." The Defendant respectfully suggests that in the
case of an "innocent miscalculation," the remedy as outlined in Harper and repeated in

1

For a more thorough discussion of Harper, please see Appellant's Brief at 8-9.

Brickey. should be a continuance, not refiling. Harper, the foundational case for the
State's argument, explicitly outlines the remedy when the State "innocently" miscalculates the level of evidence - a continuance.2 The State did not move for a continuance.
Instead, the State filed an appeal, dismissed the appeal, and subsequently refiled the
case one and one-half years later.
Counsel for Mr. Fisk was unable to locate any Oklahoma case that has allowed
a refiling simply for the reason that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith. The State
cites Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla. Crim App. 1973) for the proposition that
the state should be able to refile when it makes a mistake at the first preliminary
hearing. Appellees Brief at 19. This is a mischaracterization of the facts of Chase.
The trial court allowed the State to proceed, not because of an absence of bad faith,
but because the State demonstrated that it had new evidence that was unavailable at
the first preliminary hearing. The court summed up the analysis as follows:
[b]efore a refiling may be permitted, the charge must be brought before
the same magistrate who originally dismissed the case and consideration
by another magistrate is forbidden unless the first be unavailable. The
magistrate must decide if the substance of the new evidence offered is
sufficient to overcome the prior dismissal and whether the State has
shown good cause why that evidence was not available to it at the first
preliminary.
Chase. 517 P.2d at 1143-44. The only bearing that the prosecutor's intentions have in
2

The Defendant does not concede that the State acted in good faith in this case.
See Section III.
2

the analysis is the question regarding why the evidence was unavailable at the first
preliminary hearing. The analysis set forth in Chase requires a finding of new
evidence for refiling. Under Chase, the State's burden is to demonstrate that it has
new evidence and "good cause1' why the evidence was not available.
The cases cited by the State from Idaho and Michigan are either inapplicable to
this case or should not be followed. Idaho allows prosecutors to refile cases with
another magistrate until they get a favorable result. See e.g.. State v. Ruiz. 678 P.2d
1109 (Idaho 1984). This approach has been explicitly rejected by the Utah Supreme
Court in Brickey:
prosecutor must, whenever possible, refile the charges before the same
magistrate who does not consider the matter de novo, but looks at the
facts to determine whether the new evidence or changed circumstances
are sufficient to require a re-examination and possible reversal of the
earlier decision dismissing the charges.
Brickey. 714 P.2d at 647 (citing Jones v. State. 481 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla Crim. App.
1971)). The approach taken by Idaho violates the due process provisions of the Utah
Constitution as outlined by the Utah Supreme Court. The holding in Ruiz is, therefore, inapplicable to this case.
The State also cites case law from one other state, Michigan, that supports its
position that the State can repeatedly refile, as long as there is no evidence of bad
faith. Appellees Brief at 19-20. Although Michigan has allowed this procedure,

3

Defendant points to the alternative approach taken in Wisconsin and the rationale
adopted in Colorado, and asks that this Court adopt an approach that will responsibly
balance the due process rights of the accused and the State's need to prosecute. In
Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith. 259 N.W.2d 515 (Wis. 1977), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court outlines an approach consistent with State v. Brickey. Under Wittke. if the
State has new evidence, it can refile. In the absence of new evidence, if the State
believes the magistrate erred, the State's remedy is to file an appeal.3 This approach
provides a remedy to the State if new evidence is uncovered or if a magistrate errs
while concomitantly protecting the accused from repeated preliminary hearings with
the same evidence.4
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Brickey the "potential for abuse
inherent in the power to refile criminal charges." Brickey. 714 P.2d at 647. Even if
prosecutors make an "innocent miscalculation," the fact is that the accused suffers
hardship, expense and delay. The accused should not be punished for the tactical
decisions (wise or not) of a prosecutor. As noted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin

3

See State v. Jaeger. 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994), where the Supreme Court held that
if a prosecutor believes the Magistrate erred in the dismissal, the case may be appealed.
Id. at 54. The Jaeger Court did not countenance refiling after an insufficiency of the
evidence dismissal.
4

For an in depth discussion of Wittke and the approach taken in Colorado, see
Appellant's Brief at 9-10.
4

in Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith. ff[i]f dismissal of a first complaint does not preclude
the filing of a second, then it is difficult to see how dismissal of the second would
preclude the filing of a third, and so on, until the repeated prosecutions reached the
point of harassment." 259 N.W2d at 520. The probable cause standard at a preliminary hearing is not an exacting burden. The State with all its resources should not be
allowed to refile without additional evidence. The accused should not be dragged
through repeated preliminary hearings whenever the State fails to meet its burden.
Incompetent prosecution exacts a toll on the accused and on the resources of the
criminal justice system.
In this case, the State has no new evidence. Instead, the State has tried to recast
evidence available at the first preliminary hearing through a new expert. This is not
new evidence. See Section II, infra. Similarly, unless prosecutorial incompetence is
held to constitute Brickey good cause, the State has nothing to show to meet the "good
cause" threshold.
The State's only other justification is that there is no evidence of "bad faith," so
they should be allowed to refile. As discussed infra, the Defendant asserts that no
evidence has been presented on this topic, but even if this Court were to agree that the
State acted "innocently," this is insufficient, under Brickey and the Due Process
Clause of the Utah Constitution, to allow refiling.

5

The approach invited by the State would allow a prosecutor to refile a case
again and again, as long as the prosecutor could avoid the "bad faith" label. In a case
such as this, where no new evidence has been obtained, the State certainly has the
option to appeal. The State was not without a remedy. Rather, by failing to move for
a continuance and by withdrawing the appeal, the State abandoned its remedies. The
State should not be allowed to recast and reargue the same evidence over and over
with different prosecutors in hopes that, eventually, the magistrate will bind over.
II.

THE STATE HAS NOT PROFFERED ANY NEWLY
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

The State did not proffer any newly discovered evidence. Neither the testimony of Dr. Marion Walker nor Ms. Fisk's sworn juvenile court testimony constitute
new or previously unavailable testimony.
As briefed by Defendant before the magistrate (R. at 145-90), the State has
failed to proffer "new or previously unavailable1' evidence as identified in State v.
Brickey. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). This standard is not unlike the burden which a
party must carry to be entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a trial court to grant a new trial or
modify a judgment upon motion of a party if the party presents "newly discovered
evidence material for the party making application, which the party could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial." Rule 59 requires:
6

(a) There is material, competent evidence, which is in fact newly discovered;
(b) By due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at trial; and
(c) The evidence [is not] merely cumulative or incidental but [is] of
sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there
could have been a different result.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is not appropriate where "the evidentiary matters termed as new could have
been obtained by the exercise of ordinary diligence." Powers v. Genes Bldg. Materials, Inc.. 567 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Utah 1977).
The evidence that the State now argues warrants a new preliminary hearing
under Brickey is evidence that was available at the first preliminary hearing and was
simply overlooked, not presented or not presented well. The magistrate found that the
testimony of Dr. Marion Walker "may amount to newly discovered evidence or good
cause." R. at 361. This Conclusion of Law (No. 3; R. at 361) is internally inconsistent with the Court's own Findings of Fact.
Finding of Fact No. 5 provides in part:
However, the Court finds that the prosecutor failed to
discover facts which through the exercise of ordinary
diligence could have been discovered; failed to present
critical evidence which could have established when the
injury was inflicted and by whom the injury was inflicted.

7

Finding of Fact No. 6 provides in part:
The Court further finds that the fact existed and were
discoverable through ordinary diligence upon which this
case could have been bound-over after the original preliminary hearing.
R. at 360.
Dr. Walker is a pediatric neurosurgeon who was not consulted prior to the first
preliminary hearing. Instead, the State relied exclusively upon the testimony of Dr.
Helen Britton, a pediatrician specializing in child protection. In light of the Court's
Findings of Fact Nos 5 and 6, Conclusion of Law No. 3, (that Dr. Walker's opinion
may constitute new evidence), should be reversed under the correctness standard.5
5

As noted in Appellant's Opening Brief, the magistrate appeared to consider the
seriousness of the crime in making his determination under Brickey. Appellant's Brief
at 13, n.5. The State argues that the magistrate's personal opinion regarding guilt or
innocence is an appropriate consideration under Brickey. Appellee's Brief at 18, n.7.
The Defendant respectfully suggests that the magistrate's decision under Brickey is
limited to an analysis of whether the State has made a showing of new evidence or
other good cause. This, by the magistrate's own Findings, the State failed to do.
However, the Record discloses that a law clerk advised the magistrate that if "the
evidence is not new, but was just overlooked or could have been found with more
thorough investigation, the subsequent filing would be invalid." R. at 254. Notwithstanding this correct interpretation of the law, the same law clerk advised the magistrate that this "poses a difficult question because of the emotional nature of child
abuse. If the Fisks did actually cause the injuries to Shepherd, it would seem that the
refiling of criminal charges should be allowed." See Law Clerk Memo, R. at 254.
This memorandum prepared by a law clerk may provide some insight into how
the magistrate allowed himself to be influenced by the seriousness of the offense,
rather than limiting his inquiry to the Brickey question of whether the State had
presented new evidence or other good cause. Thus, when the magistrate made his
Brickey ruling, he stated, "while this isn't addressed in Brickey. it probably isn't
8

Similarly, the State's efforts to expand on the physical evidence in this case by
consulting another physician readily available at the first preliminary hearing should
be eschewed. This is simply an attempt to recharacterize the same evidence and term
it "new."
The State also now asserts that Ms. Fisk's sworn juvenile court testimony
constitutes new evidence. Appellee's Brief at 22, n.9. Significantly, the magistrate
did not even mention, much less consider the juvenile court testimony in its findings.
With regard to Ms. Fiskfs juvenile court testimony - prior to the first preliminary
hearing, Ms. Fisk had been interviewed by a social worker at the hospital on March
19, 1995 and on that same date was interviewed by Detectives Cheree Bams and
Detective Earl McKee. Ms. Fisk specifically told the Detectives in that interview that
she left the child in a room with her husband while she went into another room to visit
her father. (A true and correct copy of the transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A"). The State's characterization that Ms. Fisk's juvenile court testimony "established
with more precision the timing of D.S.'s injuries and exclusivity of defendant's
control" (Appellees Brief at 22, n. 9), does not constitute new evidence. This evi-

relevant for me to even consider it. And at this point and stage, it appears that Mr. Fisk
has committed a serious crime, and that's something that you have to know weighs on
any judge that looking at a situation like this as the Brickey analysis goes forward." R.
at 315. This statement by the magistrate seems to demonstrate how he was influenced
by considerations extraneous to the Brickey determination.
9

dence, which supposedly demonstrates the exclusivity of the Defendant's control over
D.S., was in the police reports readily available to the prosecutor. As with the opinion
of Dr. Walker, the State is attempting to take evidence that was available at the first
preliminary hearing, repackage it, and call it "new," so it can refile.
Neither Dr. Walker's proffer nor Ms. Fisk's testimony constitutes new evidence
to warrant refiling in this case. Accordingly, considerations of fundamental fairness
preclude the State from refiling and proceeding with a second preliminary hearing.
III.

THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF "GOOD FAITH"
CONSTITUTED ERROR.

Under State v. Brickey. 714 P.2d at 647, the burden is on the prosecutor to
show that there is a valid basis for refiling. The State failed, in the Memoranda
submitted to the magistrate or in oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, to submit
any credible evidence of the prosecutor's good faith. The State only presented
conclusory statements about "good faith11 in its Memorandum to the trial court, and
those arguments do not constitute one shred of evidence. When the magistrate sua
sponte made the finding of good faith at the hearing, it was unsupported by any
evidence and constituted error.
IV.

THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF "GOOD FAITH"
IS PLAIN ERROR.

Even if this Court were to find that Mr. Fisk waived the issue of the finding of

10

good faith, the finding was plain error. In order for an error to be "plain" under Rule
103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this Court must find that it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29,
35 (Utah 1989). Another part of the analysis is a finding that the error was harmful.
Id. "[T]he more harmful an error is, the more likely an appellate court is to conclude
that it was objectively obvious." Id. At n.8.
In this case, the prosecutor who initially prosecuted the case did not participate
at the Brickey hearing and provided no testimony by way of affidavit or otherwise. A
factual finding must be supported by some evidence. See e.g.. Smith v. Smith. 726
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).
The magistrate made a sua sponte finding of fact that the first prosecutor in this
case acted in good faith at the first preliminary hearing. This finding was unsupported
by any evidence presented by the State. The State failed to meet its burden of proving
prosecutorial "good faith,11 and this finding was, therefore, error.

V.

THE STATE MADE NO SHOWING OF GOOD CAUSE.

The State proved nothing more than an absence of bad faith through its proffer.
No evidence was marshalled to carry a burden of demonstrating good cause for the refiling. Even if the magistrate's finding of good faith is sustained, good faith does not
constitute good cause. Similarly, good faith and even a more careful attention to

11

critically important details such as the timing of the injury and the supposed exclusivity of control over the victim, when this same evidence was "discoverable in the
exercise of ordinary diligence'1 (Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. at 360-61) at the first
preliminary hearing, does not amount to good cause. The Brickey promise of due
process and fundamental fairness to the accused certainly requires more than a
prosecutor's incantation of ffI can do better, give me a second chance."
Due process limits the State's ability to refile after a dismissal for insufficiency
of the evidence to those instances where new evidence is discovered. In this case, the
State has neither new evidence nor good cause. The magistrate erred in allowing the
State to refile simply because the prosecutor did not act in bad faith. To allow the
State to refile without additional evidence will deprive this Defendant and all those
accused of a felony of fundamental fairness, will waste judicial resources, and will
impose the tremendous burden of prosecution on an accused who has been discharged.
Regardless of whether the label is prosecutorial incompetence or innocent miscalculation, a failure of proof should not constitute good cause under Brickey.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate erred in finding that the prosecutor acted in good faith because
no evidence was presented in this regard. No new evidence nor good cause was
presented to justify the refiling. For these reasons, Mr. Fisk respectfully requests that

12

this Court reverse the magistrate's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^i. day of July, 1998.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Michael James Fisk, III
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

(??)

So then, after, after he passed himself out for the last time,
I went out with mv dad, my dad was visiting, so I didnf t want
to sav that Mike was observing his breathing and stuff and
then all of a sudden Mike came running out with him and you
can tell them what happened"!
We would just let him lay, I watched him and he would always
breathe really slow, like every 3 0 seconds so that always made
me really nervous.
Then he just stopped breathing.
The
rhythm was off so I went over to look at him, so I listened
and he had a real strong heartbeat. It felt like he was still
breathing but really, really sbatt&Ai** so I rolled him on his
tummy to make sure he hadn' t ^a.spiratea>pr anything like that.
Then he made like 4 or 5 really long, really oozing breathes
that were 30 seconds, I don't know, time is really subjective,
it's really hard to say but they were widely spaced, longer
than a normal breath. They were more just long exhales, not
like he was taking in air, more mucously, congested sounding.
So then T fhmigVit- niayV>o h& ina/3. acp-i-ra^H
So, with my hand on
his back I turned him over and did some heimlich on the
stomach. I'd clear his mouth, there was nothing in there. I
gave him a couple breathes and they wouldn't go on, so then I
gave him more vigorous heimlich and still no response, I'd
hear a heartbeat, and so then I started CPR and grabbed the
keys and ran out to the van.
He gave him CPR the whole drive. Thank God that we're right
here and we drove right here. And they took over right then
and got his heart beating back up.
...on the run, somewhere between here, while we were in the
van, he started to vomit so I rolled him over and I cleared
him out and gave him couple more heimlich and he vomited
about 3 times, I cleared him out as good as I could. I didn't
dare give him a regular breath. When we pulled up, I gave him
another breath. We put him on the table and they took him.
And so there was nothing that just all of a sudden happened,
it's been, you know, just this consistent (??)
This would have been a typical day, too.
Yeah, today you didn't observe any more, thrashing or...
Just the normal, not anything, I mean, if he did fall back on
something and hit the back of his hard, but we have seen it
constantly and we had told people about this and they said
just ignore the behavior, which seemed absolutely ridiculous
to me because I knew that he was hurting himself and then when
we came in here to the ER he had bruises to prove he was
hurting himself, but they did the CAT scan, they said there
was no bleeding at the time, said that he's having breath

banging his head, burp him, and just continue to let him bang
his head. I mean, if I put him on the carpet, he finds the
book case. If I put him, you know, I mean, he doesn't just
stop and I explained that to her. So, after the Friday visit,
he had more, came back to the normal point that he would act
before I took him. He hit his head but nothing more abnormal
than what f s been going on the whole time. You know, nothing
that we can point it at, it's just the same consistent head
banging, falling down, he will fall down from standing
position, not try to catch himself, nothing.
And so, day
after day, gjid today he refused to eat his breakfast-,, he was
sitting, you know and sometimes, he wonf t make eye contact
with you, ever since this has been going on, he rolls his eyes
back into his head, he will not make eye contact with you.
He avoids any type of like if you try to interact, he tries
to avoid it, totally.
SB:

Did you, how much sleep did he get last night?

MF:

Normal, except for that he woke up at 4. He was hanging off
the bed screaming and my husband went in and put him back and
then he went right back to sleep, so there was no problems,
and acfain didn't eat breakfast, he did drink his water, but
then knocked it on the floor after he was done drinking what
he wanted to drink, so we took him out for his behavior, so
later on I tried again, he wouldn't eat it, so I decided well,
he needs to eat because he's, you know, already in the 10th
percentile of losing weight, you know, everything, we were so,
worried
about
his
nutrition and weight, he was
so
jaalnutiil^luimd b a f u m we w l him Lhafr;—yotr—krtow^ we were
worried about any more malnutrition and that sort of thing, .sg
then I fed him oatmeal, with protein, I would put protein
drink in tne oatmeal to up the calories, so I fed it to him
and he was eating it fine, you know, he wasn't responsive,
really, you know, he just would when I would say open and he'd
open and I'd feed him. And then when I was done feeding him
and when I went to brush his teeth, he threw a fit after he
was done ^ M n g and streamed and passedTout and then he' d come
to and he was standing up and he fell over once and then he
made himself pass out again, it was probably a half hour to an
hour after he had eaten when he made himself pass out and I
said, you know, keep an eye on him because we always watch him
very closely when he passes out to make sure he is still
breathing and what not.

SB:

How much oatmeal did he have?

MF:

Uum, two packages of the instant with a cup of water.

SB:

Okay.

MF:

And he ate it, you know, just fine.
I am sure he was
starving, he was just refusing to eat it.
And he never (??)
the protein drink.
0002

